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0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
CAPITAL SENTENCING REVIEW UNDER
SUPREME COURT RULE 28
Because of the qualitative difference between the death penalty
and all others under the criminal law, a correspondingly greater
need for reliability exists in the determination that a defendant
must die for his crimes.'
As a form of punishment, the death penalty is truly unique.2
Death is the ultimate penalty. Death is irrevocable; it is awesome in
its finality. Death is the only penalty sanctioned in this country
which involves the conscious infliction of pain.
The death penalty is not a recent phenomenon; its American ex-
istence predates the Republic.' Perhaps less well known, however, is
the early and relatively consistent resistance to its imposition.' Men
have been and will continue to be zealous, unbending, and dogmatic
in their avowed acceptance or rejection of this mode of punishment.
This conflict, pervasive as it so surely is, has not been foreign to our
courts.' However, not until Furman v. Georgia,' in 1972, was capital
punishment seriously questioned by the United States Supreme
Court as a constitutionally7 permissible form of punishment.' The
1. State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d 369, 375 (La. 1980) (Dennis, J., concurr-
ing in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 899 (1981).
2. Some commentators have noted that the death penalty has had great eflect on
the American criminal justice system. See M. Meltsner, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL; THE
SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973); Note, Appellate Review of Excessive
Penalties in Non-capital Cases, 42 LA. L. REV. 1080 (1982).
3. See Furman v. Georiga, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4. Id. at 335-42.
5. The continuing clash among members of the Court as to the correct manage-
ment of capital punishment cases is perhaps nowhere better epitomized than in Cof-
men v. Balkcom, 101 S. Ct. 2031 (1981). "Although those questions [related to the death
penalty) have not been difficult for three Members of the Court [Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Rehnquist) other Justices have found a number of these questions suffi-
ciently important and difficult to justify the delays associated with review in this
Court." Id at 2032 (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
6. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. The only specific mention of capital punishment in the Constitution is the fifth
amendment requirement of grand jury indictment for those capital crimes unrelated to
the military. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. The Court, in 1878, upheld the firing squad as an acceptable mode of execution
in Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). Wilkerson was followed in 1890 by In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), in which the Court sanctioned the then novel manner of
execution -electrocution -as constitutionally permissible. The issue of whether a se-
cond execution attempt was permissible when the first had failed was addressed in
State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); the Court held
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Court in Furman held that the imposition and enforcement of the
death penalty under the relevant Georgia and Texas statutes con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.' Juries in these states had "untrammeled
discretion" to impose or withhold the death penalty, which added to
the arbitrariness and caprice of their systems of capital punishment,
systems which the Court would no longer abide as constitutionally
justifiable."0
A majority of the Court did not, however, go so far as to hold
capital punishment unconstitutional per se." As a result, within four
years, Congress and the legislatures of a least 35 states enacted new
capital punishment statutes making "clear that capital punishment
itself [had] not been rejected by the elected representatives of the
people." 2
The constitutionality of five of these new state statutes was
tested in the Death Penalty Cases;"3 three withstood constitutional
that the second attempt was within accepted constitutional parameters. More recently,
the Court in Witherapoon v. Illinoi, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), held unconstitutional those
juries in capital cases chosen by excluding for cause individuals who "voiced general
objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against
its infliction." Id. at 522. When faced with the issue of pure jury discretion in the im-
position of capital punishment, the Court held that the Constitution was not infringed
thereby. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). The Court also held in Crampton
v. Ohio, decided with McGautha, that the Constitution was not violated when an in-
dividual was convicted and sentenced to death in the same proceeding.
9. 408 U.S. 238. The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment previously had been discussed by the Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349 (1910) (a fifteen year sentence at hard labor coupled with sundry other denials of
individual rights as punishment for the falsification of government documents was held
to be cruel and unusual punishment) and Trop v. Dulle8, 856 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), in
which the Court noted that the meaning of "cruel and unusual punishment" must be
drawn "from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society" and held expatriation as punishment for desertion during war unconstitu-
tional.
10. At the time of this decision "41 States, the District of Columbia, and other
federal jurisdictions [authorized] the death penalty for at least one crime... [Murder
was] the crime most often punished by death, followed by kidnapping and treason.
Rape [was] a capital offense in 16 states and the federal system." 408 U.S. at 341.
Almost six hundred men and women were on death row at that time. Id. at 316.
11. Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that any form of capital punishment
was prohibited' by the eighth amendment. Id at 305, 370-72.
12. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-83 (1976). "IBly the end of March 1976,
more than 460 persons were subject to death sentences." Id. at 182.
13. Gregg v. Georgia, 438 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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muster and two did not. Although there are differences in the pro-
cedures employed by the three states (Georgia, Florida, and Texas)"
where capital punishment statutes were upheld, the similarities are
noteworthy. Each had a bifurcated trial whereby the defendant was
convicted at one stage and sentenced at another; each focused on
the "particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the
individual offender";" and each required consideration of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances."
The post-Furman approach to capital punishment resorted to by
the other two states (North Carolina and Louisiana)7 imposed man-
datory death sentences for certain crimes. 8 The Supreme Court
signaled the quick demise of this type of system, holding that such a
system constituted cruel and unusual punishment." Louisiana, with
little delay, revamped its procedures for enforcing the death penal-
ty."0 The new Louisiana system of capital punishment is modeled in
large part on the Georgia system held constitutional in Gregg v.
Georgia," the Court's first decision in the Death Penalty Cases.
Louisiana now employs a bifurcated trial procedure with the
jury having the responsibility of imposing the death penalty. The
jury considers relevant statutory aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. At least one statutory aggravating circumstance must
14. Georgia and Texas used the jury as the sentencing authority while the trial
judge, with the advisement of the jury, handled this responsibility in Florida. Georgia
and Florida required automatic state supreme court review of all cases in which the
death penalty was imposed, whereas Texas required such review from its Court of
Criminal Appeals. Although Texas had "not adopted a list of statutory aggravating cir.
cumstances the existence of which [could] justify the imposition of the death penalty as
[had] Georgia and Florida, its actions in narrowing the categories of murders for which
a death sentence [could) ever be imposed [served] much the same purpose." Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. at 270. Although the Texas statute did'not refer explicitly to
mitigating circumstances, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals indicated it would so
interpret the Texas sentencing statute "so as to allow a defendant to bring to the
jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstance he may be able to show." Id. at 272.
The particular mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the individual procedures
varied in each state.
15. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 274.
16. See note 14, supra, for Texas procedures.
17. Louisiana, unlike North Carolina, required every jury to be instructed on the
crimes of lesser included non-capital offenses, (second-degree murder and manslaugh-
ter); even if no evidence supported the lesser verdicts provided for such offenses, the
jury was permitted to consider them. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 331, 332.
18. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325.
19. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325.
20. 1976 La. Acts, No. 694, § 1, adding LA. CoDn CRIM. P. arts. 905-905.9.
21. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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be found in order to recommend the imposition of the sentence of
death. If the jury fails to unanimously agree on a recommendation
or unanimously finds the sentence of death inappropriate, the court,
which is required to follow the recommendation of the jury, imposes
a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole,
or suspension of sentence.' Although under this new procedure the
Supreme Court of Louisiana is required to review every sentence of
death for excessiveness,2 not until 19784 did the court adopt
guidelines for such review in Supreme Court Rule 28. In pertinent
part, Rule 28 is as follows:
In determining whether the sentence [of death] is excessive the
court shall determine:
(a) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors, and
(b) whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a
statutory aggravating circumstance, 5 and
22. LA. CODE CaMH. P. arts. 905-905.9.1 (Supp. 1976, 1977, 1978 & 1979).
23. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.9 (Supp. 1976).
24. Capital punishment litigation at the United States Supreme Court level was
not dormant during the 1976-1978 period. Fourteenth amendment due process limita.
tions were held applicable to the sentencing procedure, while confidential pre-
sentencing reports containing information undisclosed to the defendant or his counsel
so that the defendant had no opportunity to deny or explain information therein were
held unconstitutional. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). Later the same year, the
sentence of death for the rape of an adult woman was held unconstitutional. Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). Then in 1978, the importance of individualized sentencing
was stressed, and a failure to consider all relevant mitigating circumstances when im-
posing the sentence of death was deemed cruel and unusual punishment. Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
25. Statutory aggravating circumstances are limited to the following:
(a) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of ag-
gravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson,
aggravated escape, armed robbery, or simply robbery;
(b) the victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his lawful duties;
(c) the offender was previously convicted of an unrelated murder, aggravated
rape, or aggravated kidnapping or has a significant prior history of criminal ac-
tivity;
(d) the offender knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more
than one person;
(e) the offender offered or has been offered or has given or received anything of
value for the commission of the offense;
(f) the offender at the time of the commission of the offense was imprisoned after
sentence for the commission of an unrelated forcible .felony;
(g) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, artrocious, or cruel man-
ner; or
(h) the victim was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave material
19821 1103.
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(c) whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and
the defendant.'
Sentence Review Under Rule 28
Rule 28 provides Louisiana's supreme court with a number of
apparent channels in which to exercise its review authority. As the
rule suggests, the possible effects of passion, prejudice, or other ar-
bitrary factors, the aggravating circumstances found, the mitigating
circumstances present, and the possible excessiveness or dispropor.
tionality of the sentence imposed, all provide fertile ground for
allegations of error. However, due perchance to the availability of a
change of venue for those defendants whose crimes have incited the
local community,27 the influence of passion on the sentence rarely is
alleged as reversible error." Likewise, the influence of prejudice on
assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defendant, or
was an eye witness to a crime alleged to have been committed- by the defendant
or possessed other material evidence against defendant;
(i) the victim was a correctional officer or any employee of the Louisiana Depart-
ment of Corrections who, in the normal course of his employment was required to
come in close contact with persons incarcerated in a state prison facility, and the
victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the offense.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.4 (Supp. 1976 & 1979).
26. Mitigating circumstances to be considered in determining if the sentence is ex-
cessive include the following:
-(a) the offender has no significant history of criminal activity;
(b) the offense was committed while the offender was under the influence of ex-
treme mental or emotional disturbance;
(c) the offense was committed while the offender was under the influence or under
the domination of another person;
(d) the offense was committed under circumstances which the offender reasonably
believed to provide a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct;
(e) at the time of the offense the capacity of the offender to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication;
(f) the youth of the offender at the time of the offense;
(g) the offender was a principal whose participation was relatively minor;
(h) any other relevant mitigating circumstance.
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.5 (Supp. 1976).
27. State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240, 247 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 253
(1981).
28. But see State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d 1336, 1345 (La. 1979), sentence
upheld on second appeal, 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981) (defendant argued that it was im-
possible for him to receive a fair trial in the court of proper venue due to adverse
pretrial publicity; venue was changed for the defendant's second sentencing hearing).
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a sentence is infrequently the basis of complaint." As such, the
typical supreme court review in capital punishment cases begins
with a determination "of whether the evidence supports the jury's
finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance." Should the court
support the aggravating circumstances found by the jury, it then
determines whether the defendant's death sentence is dispropor-
tionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. The court considers
both the actual crime committed by the defendant and whether the
gravity of such crime is affected by any relevant mitigating cir-
cumstances when so determining disproportionality.
Aggravating Circumstances
Generally
Of the aggravating circumstances found in the Louisiana statute,
those most frequently encountered and accordingly most widely
discussed include the following: (1) the offense was committed in an
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner; (2) the offender know-
ingly. created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one
person; (3) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempt-
ed perpetration of armed robbery; (4) the offender was engaged in
the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnap-
ping; and (5) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or at-
tempted prepetration of aggravated burglary.0 Perhaps because of
the wealth of existing case law defining the necessary elements of
those aggravating circumstances which are themselves separate
statutory criminal offenses,"1 the court has not found expansive or
detailed discussion necessary for their support. "Risk of death or
29. But see State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d at 243, 249 (Calogero, J., concurring and
Dennis, J., concurring on original hearing); State v. Berry, 391 So. 2d 406, 411 (La.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2347 (1981).
30. See note 25, supra.
81. Seven of Louisiana's aggravating circumstances are themselves criminal of-
fenses. These are: (1) aggravated rape, CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950 & Supp.
1978); (2) aggravated kidnapping, CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:44 (1950 & Supp. 1980); (3)
aggravated burglary, CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:60 (1950); (4) aggravated arson,
CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:51 (1950 & Supp. 1964 & 1977); (5) aggravated escape,
CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:110 (1950 & Supp. 1954, 1963, 1968, 1970 & 1972); (6) armed
robbery, CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:64 (1950 & Supp. 1958, 1962, & 1966); and (7) sim-
ple robbery, CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:65 (1950 & Supp. 1977 & 1980Y. Sentences for
the conviction of these crimes run from a fine of not more than $3,000 or Imprisonment
with or without hard labor for not more than seven years, or both for simple robbery,
up to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspen-
sion of sentence for aggravated rape or aggravated kidnapping.
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great bodily harm to more than one person" and "heinous, atrocious
or cruel manner" have been more enigmatic.
Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel Manner
Since the advent of Supreme Court Rule 28, juries have found
that "the offense was committed in an espeically heinous, atrocious
or cruel manner" in no fewer than nine of the fifteen cases in which
the sentence of death was imposed."2 Yet, in only three cases has the
supreme court determined that the evidence presented supported
this finding. Such a situation is necessarily indicative of a problem;
the problem in this instance lies in the test's subjectivity. Murder,
any murder, is cruel, almost by definition. The court, no doubt
aware of this deficiency,U attempted in State v. English"5 to
establish some parameters within which the sentencing jury could
find the manner. of commission of a murder especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel. The court stated "any system that seeks to
distinguish rationally among murders in terms of heinousness must
necessarily incorporate into that concept some idea of torture or the
pitiless infliction of unnecessary pain on the victim."3 " Although this
test for heinousness was merely dicta in English, it became part of
Louisiana law when in State v. Sonnier, it was specifically adopted
by the court."
32. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1981); State v. Culberth, 390 So. 2d 847
(La. 1980); State v. Baldwin, 388 So. 2d 664 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 901
(1981); State v. Clark, 387 So. 2d 1124 (La. 1980); State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d
369 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 899 (1981); State v. Sonnier (Eddie), 380 So. 2d 1
(La. 1979); State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1979), sentence upheld on sec-
ond appeal, 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981); State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979), cert.
denied 101 S. Ct. 540 (1980); State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815 (La. 1979).
33. State v. Sonnier (Eddie), 380 So. 2d 1 (defendant Eddie with his brother, Elmo,
raped a girl; the girl and her boyfriend were then slain); State v. Clark, 387 So. 2d
1124 (defendant had a gun but used it belatedly, choosing first to stab his victim 30 to
35 times); State v. Baldwin, 388 So. 2d 364 (defendant beat an 84-year-old woman with
various blunt objects, including a skillet, a stool and a telephone, then left her to die a
lingering death). Sufficient support for the jury's finding that the offense was commit-
ted in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner was also found in the original
hearing of State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d 1336.
34. "[Albsent some limiting judicial construction the statutory terms are open to
attack as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and thus furnishing insufficient ob-
jective standards as guidelines so as to avoid their arbitrary and discriminatory ap-
plication in the imposition of the death penalty." State v..English, 367 So. 2d at 823
(appendix).
35. Id.
36. Id. The court also noted that there "are few delicate methods of committing
murder, and none of them involve the use of a gun." Id.
37. 379 So. 2d 1336, 1361.
1106 [Vol. 42
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Unfortunately, the court in Sonnier did not stop with the adop-
tion of the English test for heinousness; it went on to conclude "that
the torture or pitiless infliction of pain could be either physical or
psychological."" The inclusion of mental pain again subjected the
test to charges of arbitrariness and caprice." However, in only one
other instance did the court use this standard of psychological inflic-
tion of unnecessary pain to uphold "heinous, atrocious or cruel man-
ner"-in the companion case to State v. Sonnier (Elmo), State v.
Sonnier (Eddie)." Eddie, with his brother Elmo, raped a girl and
then murdered her and her boyfriend. The court appeared to find
unnecessary infliction of mental pain in that the boy was handcuffed
to a tree while the girl was raped," one victim witnessed the
murder of the other, and both victims had foreknowledge of their
impending demise.'" Eddie's sentence of death was overturned on
other grounds," and when the issue of psycological infliction of un-
necessary pain was again presented in the second supreme court
review of Elmo's sentence," the court retreated from its earlier in-
terpretation.
Recognizing similarities in the Georgia and Louisiana statutory
definitions of "outrageously vile" and "especially heinous," the Loui-
siana Supreme Court held that some of the rules detailed in Godfrey
v. Georgia," were applicable to Louisiana."' In Godfrey, the United
States Supreme Court held that a broad reading of the Georgia stan-
dard of "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible' or inhuman" would
render a sentence imposed thereunder cruel and unusual punish-
ment.'7 Specifically, a finding of torture would be limited to those
cases wherein there was "evidence of serious physical abuse of the
victim before death";" juries would have to receive instructions on
this proper, narrow construction of the statute when considering
whether to impose the death penalty on the basis of this ag-
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id at 1367 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
40. 380 So. 2d 1.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id at 9. See State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d at 1367 (Dennis, J.,
dissenting).
43. 380 So. 2d at 7-9.
44. 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981).
45. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
46. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 402 So. 2d 650.
47. 446 O.S. 420 (1980).
48. 402 So. 2d at 659. Justice Blanche, however, would not limit the infliction of
pain to physical pain. Id. at 662 (Blanche, J., concurring).
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gravating circumstance." As neither physical abuse of the victim
nor the required jury instructions were found in Elmo's case, a ma-
jority of the court refused to support the jury's finding that his of-
fense *was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner.
50
Even when applying the original test as adopted in Sonnier, i.e.,
the necessity that there be torture or the pitiless infliction of un.
necessary pain on the victim, the members of the court have dif..
fered in their ideas of what constitutes "heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner." Justice Lemmon found a murder committed by stabbing
the victim in the presence of her children especially cruel in its man-
ner of-commission.5 ' Justice Marcus found the murders for which
Elmo Sonnier was convicted to have been committed in an especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel manner."2 Justice Marcus also found sup.
port for this aggravating circumstance when the offender stabbed
his victim, retreated, then returned to stab her again; death being
non-instantaneous." Justice Blanche views rape as an infliction of
unnecessary pain on the victim."'
Clearly, all vestiges of the subjectivity of this test have not, as
yet, been eliminated. One apparent constant, however, has been
found. The majority refuses to support "heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner" as an aggravating circumstance when the wounds inflicted
are intended to kill, not maim, cripple or torture in a conscienceless
and merciless manner.""5 Other trends or constants probably. will
never be discernible as this classification is inherently susceptible to
greatly varied interpretations -even though the court has greatly
limited the scope of permissible constructions. Any further elucida-
tions of the definition of "heinous, atrocious or cruel manner" will
likely evolve on an ad hoc basis.
Risk of Death or Great Bodily Harm to More Than One Person
Unlike the aggravating circumstance previously discussed,
"[riisk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person" has
49. Id
50. Id
51. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d at 1280 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
52. 402 So. 2d at 650 (Marcus. J., concurring).
53. State v. Culberth, 390 So. 2d at 851 (Marcus, J., concurring in part and dis.
senting in part).
54. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 402 So. 2d at 662 (Blanche, J., concurring).
55. State v. English, 367 So. 2d at 823 (appendix). Accord, State v. Culberth, 390
So. 2d at 851.
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proved to be less problematical for the court. Again, as was the case
for "heinous, atrocious or cruel manner," the court's first attempt to
deal with this problem was in the appendix to State v. English.m
The court therein detailed two possible methods of interpreting this
aggravating circumstance. Risk of death or great bodily harm: (1) ap-
plies only to situations "where the same act which kills the victim
also knowlingly creates a risk of death or great bodily injury to
more than one person,"" te., "the defendant sets a fire or explodes a
bomb in an inhabited building, or shoots randomly into a crowd";" or
(2) applies to those situations described in (1) and to those cases in
which a "single consecutive course of conduct contemplates and
causes the knowing creation of great risk of death or great bodily
harm to more than one person,"5' ie., the defendant intentionally
shoots one person and then, continuing in his original design, im-
mediately shoots another. The court, although satisfied that either
construction of this aggravating circumstance would be sufficient to
prevent the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty, 0
expressly reaffirmed its acceptance of the second interpretation -a
single conservative course of conduct contemplating and causing the
knowing creation of great risk of death or great bodily harm to
more than one person-in State v. Sonnier (Elmo), but limited the
holding to those instances where to prevent the disclosure of the
previous murder, the offender killed another person." Later, in
State v. Culberth,"' this limiting factor was dropped, and the court
embraced the full unfettered second interpretation of "risk of death
or great bodily harm to more than one peison." This aggravating
circumstance now is established both "where the same act which
kills the victim also knowingly creates a risk of death or great bodi-
ly injury to more than one person"" and "where the defendant by a
single and consecutive course of conduct contemplates and causes a
great risk to more than one person.""'
.56. 367 So. 2d at 823 (appendix).
57. Id. at 824.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id.
61. 379 So. 2d at 1362. But see id. at 1367 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part on original hearing, argued that the first construction of the statute
is the proper one.). The court relied on the Sonnier fElmo) interpretation of "risk of
death or great bodily harm to more than one person" in Martin, 376 So. 2d at 312.
62. 390 So. 2d 847.
63. State v. English, 367 So. 2d at 824 (appendix).
64. State v. Culberth, 390 So. 2d at 851. Accord, State v. Smith, 400 So. 2d 587
(La. 1981); State v. Monroe, 397 So. 1258; State v. Berry, 391 So. 2d 406; State v. Son-
nier (Eddie), 380 So. 2d 1; State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d 300.
19821 1109
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The court's interpretation of this aggravating circumstance ap-
pears proper, although arguably broader than strictly required. An
offender who intentionally shoots one person and then, continuing in
his original design, immediately shoots another, has created no less
a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person than
has a different offender who shoots randomly into a crowd. In either
situation, the court should find support for this aggravating cir-
cumstance.
Unsupported Aggravating Circumstances
In only four cases has the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed
the constitutionality of those death sentences based in part on un-
supported jury findings of one or more statutory aggravating cir..
cumstances. The majority's view-as long as one aggravating cir.
cumstance is supported, the sentence may be upheld-is implicit;
both in the court's decision in State v. Sonnier (Elmo, on original
hearing)," and in Justice Blanche's majority opinion in State v. Mar.
tin.7 The court in Martin concluded that the defendant knowingly
created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one per-
son; the majority upheld the sentence of death without reaching the
other aggravating circumstances found by the jury, deeming "it un-
necessary to inquire whether the jury could have correctly found
that the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel manner."" Similarly, in State v. Williams, the court found sup-
port for the jury's finding that the offender was engaged in the
perpetration of an armed robbery, and then upheld the death
sentence while failing even to discuss the other two aggravating cir-
cumstances found by the jury-risk of death or great bodily harm to
more than one person and heinous, atrocious or cruel manner-"fur-
ther inquiry as to whether these other aggravating circumstances
were properly found to exist [being] merely cumulative and un-
necessary to support the jury's verdict." 9 Not until the court's affir-
mance of the death sentence in State v. Monroe, however, did the
majority explicitly hold that it knew "of no constitutional require-
ment that a death sentence be vacated whenever the jury [erred) in
65. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d 1258; State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d 369;
State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1979), sentence upheld on second appeal,
402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981); State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d 300.
66. 379 So. 2d 1336.
67. 376 So. 2d 300.
68. lId at 312.
69. State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So.2d at 374.
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its finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance.""0
Justice Dennis dissented from the majority's affirmance of
sentence in all four cases, Sonnier, Martin, Williams, and Monroe.7
The basis of these dissents, pertinent to the issue presently discuss-
ed, lies in four parts. First, the jury has the exclusive responsibility
of determing that the death penalty is appropriate; the court cannot,
on appeal, make this decision its own. However, the court essential-
ly does determine on its own that the death penalty is appropriate
when it disregards the influence of the erroneous finding of an ag-
gravating circumstance on the jury's recommendation of death or
assumes "that the jury would have made the same recommendation
despite the error. 72 Second, the error of the jury in finding an ag-
gravating circumstance which the court is unable to support may in-
troduce an impermissible degree of arbitrariness and caprice, (an ar-
bitrary factor),7 into the jury recommendation of death, thereby
rendering the sentence unconstitutional."4 Third, the sentencing jury
is likely to be impressed with the number of aggravating cir-
cumstances found, as there is a rational difference between a finding
of, for example, three aggravating circumstances as opposed to one.
The jurors in such a case, through the mere force of common sense,
could conclude justifably that "the more aggravating circumstances
found to exist the more likely it is that any mitigating cir-
cumstances are outweighed and that the death penalty is ap-
propriate. '" Fourth, Stephens v. Zant, wherein the Untied States
Fifth Circuit of Appeals overturned a death sentence recommended
by a Georiga jury upon a finding of three statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances, any of which would be legally sufficient by itself to
justify the death penalty and one of which was later held unconstitu-
tional,76 contains the correct principle to be followed where a
statutory aggravating circumstance is not supported; the sentence
70. 397 So. 2d at 1276. Accord, id. at 1280 (Lemmon, J., concurring). But cf. State
v. Smith, 400 So. 2d 587 (the court remanded the case for the trial judge to develop ad-
ditional facts so the court could determine if "risk of death or great bodily harm to
more than one person" was supported).
71. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d at 1280; State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d at
375; State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d at 314; State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d at 1364 (on
original hearing).
72. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d at 1368.
73. See text at note 122, infra.
74. State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d at 376.
75. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d at 1282.
76. Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 90
(1981).
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should be vacated and remanded for reconsideration." All of these
arguments posed by Justice Dennis are logically appealing, yet he
was unable to garner any additional support for them on the present
court. Recognizing the futility of his position, Justice Dennis reluc-
tantly joined the majority position in State v. Sonnier 8
A reversal of the parties, with the majority joining Justice Den-
nis' position, would have been a preferable turn of events. When one
remembers the factors being balanced -the costs of a new sentenc-
ing hearing so as to eliminate all doubt as to the jury's recommenda-
tion in such a case versus the life of the defendant-the appeal of
Justice Dennis' position is manifest. Only in those cases where the
court has determined "beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have recommended death independently of its erroneous fin-
ding" should the sentence be upheld. In all other cases, the court
should order a new sentencing hearing."0
Due Process
The death penalty was expressly upheld under the Louisiana
constitution in State v. Myles."' A short time thereafter, Louisiana
capital sentencing procedures were deemed sufficient to eliminate
the risk of arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence."
When taken together, these decisions represent a majority of the
court's view.that death as punishment in Louisiana does not deprive
a defendant of his life without due process of law.
Justice Dennis, however, has assailed the court's "refusal to ar-
ticulate standards of review for errors of fact and law in capital
sentence proceedings ...[asserting] that the standards applied by
the majority. . . fall short of the minimum criteria necessary to
assure due process of law."8" Justice Dennis bases this assertion on
what he considers the mistaken adoption by the majority, when con-
sidering the criterion of reasonable doubt, of the "some evidence"
77. State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d at 1281. The majority expressly rejected the argu,
ment that Stephens v. Zant was applicable to Louisiana by differentiating the capital
sentencing schemes of Georgia and Louisiana. Id at 1275, 1276.
78. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 402 So. 2d at 660 n.2.
79. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d at 1368.
80. See Pugh & Radamaker, A Plea for Greater Judicial Control Over Sentencing
and Abolition of the Present Plea Bargaining System, 42 LA. L. REv. 79 (1981).,
81. 389 So. 2d 12, 16 (La. 1979). But see District Attorney v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d
1274 (Mass. 1980) wherein the Massachusetts Supreme Court held the death penalty
unconstitutional under their state constitution.
82. State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d at 310, 311.
83. Id. at 317 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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rule or another constitutionally inadequate standard of review."
Every element of the crime charged must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt for an accused to be convicted;" the Louisiana
capital sentencing jury must find the presence of at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt
before recommending the death penalty." Cognizant of the need for
greater reliability in capital cases, Justice Dennis, relying heavily on
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Virgina,"
stated:
[T]his Court cannot approve a death penalty in the face of an er-
ror in a capital sentencing hearing, unless it is convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the mistake was inconsequential to the
jury's recommendation. . .. . [Tihis Court's review of a capital
sentence must be not simply to determine whether the jury was
properly instructed on reasonable doubt, but to determine
whether the record evidence can reasonably support a finding of
an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt."
The court's failure to articulate and follow these standards of review
for errors of fact and law results in the increased possibility both
"of misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable
doubt" and jury recommendations influenced by error or other ar-
bitrary factors."
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the state's evidentiary
burden in all criminal cases; if the state fails to meet this standard
of proof, a defendant is not to be convicted, let alone sentenced. Yet,
in review of a sentencing hearing wherein the spectre of death
shadows the defendant, the majority fails even to assert its desire
to adhere to this elementary principle; its failure to articulate its
position is hardly laudable.
84. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d at 1367 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part on original hearing).
85. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
86. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.3 (Supp. 1976).
87. Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1980).
88. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d at 1364, 1365 (Dennis, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part on original hearing). See State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d
at 376 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d at 1365 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part on original hearing). No other justice has, as yet, expressly joined
Justice Dennis' stated position on this issue. Justice Dennis did, however, have..the
support of the majority when he announced the standard of what constitutes effective
representation of counsel in a Louisiana death penalty case-the defendant is to
receive "the competent assistance of an attorney acting as a diligent, conscientious ad-
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The Louisiana capital punishment scheme embodies a two-fold
test. The primary burden is on the jury; it must find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and then, before recommending the death penalty,
find the presence of an aggravating circumstance, again, beyond a
reasonable doubt. During the second stage, review, the court pores
over the evidence to determine if the jury's finding can be
reasonably supported. In the event one of the aggravating cir-
cumstances is not supported, to uphold the death sentence, the "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard should again be met." A
sentence of death should not be upheld in the face of such an error,
or any error for that matter, in the sentencing hearing, unless the
court is assured beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's recom-
mendation would have been the same absent the error. To do other-
wise is to impose capital punishment under a standard less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, is to impose the sentence of death in
an arbitrary and capricious fashion, is to deny a defendant his life
by using a standard impermissible to convict a pickpocket, is to
deny due process of law.
Disproportionality Review
As use of the word "disproportionate" suggests, the court's
analysis under Rule 28's third canon of review-whether tile
sentence imposed is disproportionate -consists principally of a
determination whether the particular defendant's death sentence is
out of proportion. to the crime he committed. In making this deter-
mination, the court considers the mitigating circumstances present
in the case," the actual crime committed by the defendant, and the
comparison of the sentence imposed with sentences in similar cases.
Uniformity in sentencing, at least on a parish-wide basis, is required.
Mitigating Circumstances
Typical mitigating circumstances alleged by those offenders
sentenced to die include no significant prior history of criminal ac-
tivity, 2 limited intelligence, 3 and mental impairment due to intoxica-
vocate for his life." State v. Myles, 389 So. 2d at 30 (on rehearing; the only Louisiana
death sentence overturned due to a lack of effective representation of counsel). See
also State v. Smith, 400 So. 2d at 595 (Dennis, J., concurring); State v. Berry, 391 So.
2d 406; State v. Clark, 387 So. 2d 1124; State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240.
90. See text at note 65, 8upra.
91. See note 26, aupra.
92. State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d 369; State v. Sonnier (Eddie), 380 So. 2d
1; State v. Martin, 376 So. 2d 300.
93. State v. Sonnier (Eddie), 380 So. 2d 1; State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240.
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tion, either alcohol or drug induced." Only in State v. Sonnier (Ed-
die)," however, has the court deemed the presence of mitigating cir-
cumstances so persuasive as to require reversal of a sentence of
death and imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without
benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in its stead."
Eddie Sonnier, twenty years old at the time of his offense, had no
significant prior history of arrest. Eddie was "a young man of ex-
citable disposition with little education ... characterized as a mental
and physical weakling." 7 Although he did rape the female victim,
Eddie only participated in the murders to a minor extent," and that
was decidedly under his brother Elmo's" influence and insistence."'
The court was unanimous in its determination that the mitigating
circumstances present in Eddie's case outweighed the aggravating
circumstances found by the sentencing jury and supported on
review (armed robbery, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, ag-
gravated burglary, risk of death or great bodily harm to more than
one person, and heinous, atrocious or cruel manner). Eddie's death
sentence was clearly inappropriate.
The actual mitigating circumstances present in each case, of
course, vary. That Sonnier (Eddie), was the only case overturned as
a result of their presence should in no way be considered indicative
of a reluctance on the part of the court carefully to consider
mitigating circumstances. Quite the contrary, the court assesses
94. State v. Myles, 389 So. 2d 12 (La. 1980); State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d
369; State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d 240; State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815.
95. 380 So. 2d 1.
96. Id. Justices Calogero and Dennis, in separate dissents in State v. Martin, 376'
So. 2d 300, 314, contended that the mitigating circumstances present in that case, (no
significant history of prior criminal activity, the influence of extreme mental and emo-
tional disturbances, moral justification for the offense, and, as contended by Justice
Dennis, the offender's impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law), offset the aggravating cir-
cumstances they thought present. Justice Tate concurred in the dissents of Justices
Calogero and Dennis. Id. at 314. The court in State v. English, 367 So. 2d 815, re-
versed the defendant's sentence of death as a result of the trial court's erroneous
refusal to give a requested charge on mental defect. Due to ex post facto principles.
after the reversal of sentence, "the greatest penalty imposable upon the accused was
life imprisonment." Id. at 821.
97. State v. Sonnier (Eddie), 380 So. 2d at 8.
98. But see State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 402 So. 2d at 654. Eddie recanted his
testimony in his brother Elmo's second sentencing trial, claiming he shot the victims,
in an apparent effort to save Elmo from electrocution.
99. See State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So. 2d 1336 (La. 1979), sentence upheld on
second appeal, 402 So. 2d 650 (La. 1981).
100. State v. Sonnier (Eddie), 380 So. 2d at 8.
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each mitigating factor alleged by a defendant with particular care.
That more death sentences have not been overturned as a result of
their presence is primarily a function of the harshness of the crimes
committed and the paucity of the mitigating circumstances proved..
Disproportionate Sentence
The reversal of sentence in Sonnier (Eddie),'0' was not based en-
tirely on the balancing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
The case was again unique in that a majority of the court expressly
held that the sentence imposed (death) did "not conform with
sentences meted our in other first degree murder cases."'02 Indeed,
in only one other case, State v. Williams,13 has so much as a dissent
been partially based on the disproportionality' of the sentence im-
posed. James Williams fatally shot the manager of a gasoline station
during the course of an armed robbery. Although his resulting
sentence of death was upheld on original hearing, one justice con-
sidered it disproportionate. The dissenting justice opined that the
circumstances involved in Williams' case were less aggravated than
those found in three other first degree murder cases wherein the
defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment, State v.
Edwards,"'0 State v. Collins,"" and State v. Spooner.' As a teenager,
Edwards, with two cohorts, broke into the home of a 78 year old
woman. Edwards searched for the woman, found her in the
bathroom and stabbed her numerous times.'0 Collins, after raping
his victim, slashed, stabbed, and beat her.'" Spooner strangled his
victim." Juries in the parish where Williams was sentenced had
previously recommended the death penalty in only two cases. One
such case involved an armed robbery, the murder of a security
guard, and the allegedly unintentional shooting of two persons;' the
other involved an armed robbery during the course of which the vic-
101. Id. at 9.
102. Id. at 8.
103. State v. Williams (James), 392 So. 2d 619, 627 (La. 1980).
104. Section 4 of Supreme Court Rule 28 requires the district attorney to file a
memorandum on behalf of the state listing each first degree murder case in the
district after January 1, 1976.
105. 375 So. 2d 1365 (La. 1979).
106. 378 So. 2d 928 (La. 1979), cert. dented, 447 U.S. 928 (1980).
107. 368 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1979).
108. 375 So. 2d 1365.
109. 378 So. 2d 928.
110. 368 So. 2d 1086.
111. State v. Williams (Robert). 383 So. 2d 369.
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tim was stabbed thirty to thirty-five times and then shot." '
In light of these cases, the disproportionality of Williams' death
sentence would appear to be fairly obvious. Yet, a majority of the
court apparently did not appreciate this fact; Williams' sentence was
not held to be excessive. Williams, as no other case, points out the
problems and inconsistencies of the court's current method of
reviewing for disproportionality. The pool of cases available for com-
parison is unnecessarily limited to the parish where the defendant is
tried. The court's analysis could be strengthened if the available
pool had a broader base and included more cases,"' which, in turn,
would reduce the risk of arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
Parish-Wide versus State-Wide Review
Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 28 provides for review of the
proportionality of death sentences on a parish-wide basis."' Yet, in
all its capital cases, Georgia, whose procedures provided the ostensi-
ble model for the Louisiana rule,' requires state-wide review. Not
suprisingly, this dissimilarity in the sytems of the two states provid-
ed the foundation of a constitutional attack on Louisiana review pro-
cedures, State v. Prejean." Upon examining the procedures
employed'in those states where capital punishment was expressly
held constitutional, (Texas, Florida, and Georgia), Justice Dennis,
in dissent, concluded that Louisiana's system, parish-wide review for
disproportionality, was constitutionally impermissible. Of particular
importance to Justice Dennis, the Georgia Supreme Court inter-
preted its statute, identical to the Louisiana rule, "as requiring it to
compare any case before it with all 'similar cases' not simply those
112. State v. Clark, 387 So. 2d 1124.
113. When, in State v. Martin, the court was to review a sentence of death for
disproportionality and had no other sentences in first degree murder cases for com-
parison, the court used a list submitted by the defense. The list reported cases
of defendants who were charged with first degree murder and were either al-
lowed to plea bargain to a lesser included offense or were found guilty of a lesser
included offense by a jury .... land) several other cases in which [the defense al-
leged] the elements of first degree murder were present but the defendant was
charged with another offense.
376 So. 2d at 313.
114. SuP. CT. R. 28, § 4.
115. State v. Williams (Robert), 383 So. 2d at 373; State v. Sonnier (Elmo), 379 So.
2d at 1358; 379 So. 2d at 1370 (on rehearing).
116. 379 So. 2d at 251 (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
117. See note 13, supra.
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from one particular court but those from throughout the state.""' A
majority of the Louisiana Supreme Court has not, as yet, joined
Justice Dennis in his conclusion that Louisiana death sentences
should be reviewed for disproportionality with sentences in other
first degree murder cases "throughout the state." Justice Dixon,
however, has taken such a stand,"' and it is to be hoped that the
other members of the court will not be long in joining him. The
preferable mechanism, state-wide review, is easily implemented. The
district attorney in each parish would be required to file one initial
report, listing "each first degree murder case in the district in
which sentence was imposed after January 1, 1976 .... [including]
the docket number, caption, crime convicted, sentence actually im-
posed and a synopsis of the facts in the record concerning the crime
and the defendant."' ' The district attorney would then update his
report, giving the same type of information, whenever another per-
son was convicted of first degree murder in his parish. In this
relatively simple fashion, the court would. be provided with all the
necessary data to conduct a review for disproportionality of sentenc-
ing in all capital cases on a state-wide basis. 2'
The decision to allow death as a form of punishment was made
by the state legislature, a body representing all areas of the state;
the decision to uphold the death sentence, once imposed, should in
like manner be based on a review representative of the state as a
whole. By implementing this procedure, the court would insure Loui-
siana as *having one justice for all; defendants tried for similar
crimes would receive similar sentences, irrespective of the location
of their trials. The ideal of any court, the fair administration of
justice, requires no less.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's review of capital sentences
primarily revolves around those topics previously discussed. An-
118. State v. Prejean, 379 So. 2d at 252 (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing).
119. State v. Williams (James), 392 So. 2d at 626 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
120. SuP. CT. R. 28, § 4. This information is even now required by the court when a
person has been sentenced to die in a particular parish. Id.
121. To decrease the risk of arbitrariness even further, the court need only in-
crease the pool of cases used for review of disproportionality to include those cases of
defendants who were charged with first degree murder and were allowed to plea
bargain to a lesser included offense. Although a defendant might face formidable
obstacles in obtaining the necessary information, he could make a valid argument that
his death sentence was disproportionate if he could prove that another offender, who
committed a crime similar to his own, was allowed to plea bargain to second degree
murder.
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other notable problem, however, is related to capital sentencing: the
effect of arbitrary factors on the sentence imposed, as embodied in
Rule 28's first standard of review.
A bitrariness
Louisiana's entire system of capital punishment is designed to
prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death
penalty.' For the most part, the system has been effective in
achieving this goal. Cases where "arbitrariness" has been alleged
and upheld by the court are few; those that exist are not indicative
of systematic inadequacies but instead point to isolated errors at in-
dividual trials.
The trial court's failure to instruct the jury properly required
reversal of sentence in three cases, State v. Sonnier (Elmo),'2 State
v. Williams,"' and State v. Lindsey.' In Sonnier, the court, when
questioned by the sentencing jury, failed to properly explain that a
person convicted of murder in any degree is ineligible for participa-
tion in work-release programs. The supreme court held that the
jury's concern, induced by the trial court, that the defendant might
return to society through work-release was "an 'arbitrary factor'
contributing to [the] jury's recommendation of the death penalty."'2
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the court in Williams
failed to properly inform the jurors that if. they were unable to
agree unanimously on a recommendation, a sentence of life imprison-
ment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence
would be imposed. The supreme court, on rehearing, held that by
failing to give the proper instruction, the jury's discretion was not
suitably directed or limited. A juror could have reasonably inferred
that absent a unanimous decision, a new sentencing hearing or trial
would be required. This false impression could have induced a relu-
cant juror to join the majority rather than subject the parties, the
witnesses and the court to additional proceedings. As such, an im-
permissible risk was thereby created that the death penalty would
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.'
122. State v. Sonnier (Elmo). 379 So. 2d at 1371 (on rehearing); State v. Martin, 376
So. 2d at 310, 311. See also text at note 73, supra.
123. 379 So. 2d at 1336.
124. State v. Williams (James), 392 So. 2d 619.
125. 404 So. 2d 466 (La. 1981).
126. 379 So. 2d at 1369-1371.
127. State v. Williams (James), 392 So. 2d 619. See Joseph, Developments In The
Law, 1980-1981, 42 LA. L. REV. 693 (1982).
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Reversal of sentence was required in Lindsey as a result of the
trial court's charge and the prosecutor's remarks during the sen-
tencing phase of the trial. Both the prosecutor and the trial court
referred to the possibility that the defendant could be pardoned if
he received a sentence of life imprisonment. Although other inade-
quacies were found, the supreme court's analysis pointedly referred
to the impropriety of discussion at the sentencing hearing of the
possibility of pardon for persons sentenced to life imprisonment.
The court, although not imposing a "blanket prohibition," held "that
conditions under which a person sentenced to life imprisonment
without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence
[could] be released at some time in the future [was] not a proper con-
sideration for a capital sentencing jury and [should] not [have been]
discussed in the jury's presence."' 8 The court then indicated the
proper response should a jury seek information in regards to the
possibility of release of the defendant.'" The court also noted that
upon review of a capital case in which the state or the trial court in-
terjected the defendant's "potential for future release," the court
would presume that the "death sentence was imposed under the in-
fluence of an arbitrary factor unless the record clearly [indicated]
that the jury was properly informed of its duty and admonished to
disregard the improper remark, and the record [indicated] that the
jury heeded the admonition."'
Those types of errors previously described by the court as im-
permissible arbitrary factors should now virtually be eliminated, as
the court in Sonnier (Elmo), Williams, and Lindsey,"' has essentially
detailed the instructions required in a capital sentencing proceeding.
The Louisiana Supreme Court; however, has not limited the per-
missible scope of the trial court's charge to the sentencing jury on
aggravating circumstances to those aggravating circumstances
which reasonably can be supported by the evidence. This omission is
regrettable, as it increases the likelihood of jury findings of ag-
gravating circumstances which are unsupportable on review. Why
such a simple proposal has not been adopted is indeed perplexing',
128. State v. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d at 466.
129. The jury "must be informed that it is duty bound to disregard how other
governmental bodies may, in their wisdom and subject to other constraints, act but, in-
stead, must concentrate upon whether it presently feels, in light of the character of
the offender and the nature of the offense," the death sentence is or is not appropriate.
Id. at 487. See also Joseph, Developments In The Law, 1980-1981, 42 LA. L. REV. 693
(1982).
130. State v. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d at 487.
131. State v. Lindsey, 404 So. 2d 466; State v. Williams (James), 392 So. 2d 619;
State v. Sonnier (Elmo). 379 So. 2d 1336.
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especially since it so easily does so much to reduce the risk of ar-
bitrary jury findings of aggravating circumstances. Nevertheless,
courts and prosecutors should be aware that few, if any, references
to the defendant's "potential for future release" are permissible;'32 to
refer to such topics is to invite the overturning of the resulting
death sentence due to the influence of an arbitrary factor.
Conclusion
What is, by our society, considered the sanctity of life applies to
accused as well as victim, and rightfully so, for by deriding the
former, we denigrate the latter. Supreme Court Rule 28 was
adopted in this spirit. The Rule, as interpreted by the court, has
been and will continue to be a highly effective safeguard over
capital punishment in Louisiana. Yet, as with most protective
devices, the risk of error cannot be eliminated, only minimized.
Resentencing those defendants whose sentences were based in part
on aggravating circumstances not supported on review, adopting
those standards of due process enunciated by Justice Dennis,
reviewing sentences state-wide rather than parish-wide, and limiting
jury instructions on aggravating circumstances to those aggravating
circumstances which can be reasonably supported by the evidence,
are additional prophylactic measures available to the court; although
perhaps not constitutionally mandated, these measures could only
aid in further minimizing the risk of error.' "
M. Dwayne Johnson
132. Justice Calogero, in dissent on application for rehearing, found reversible er-
ror in the prosecutor's referral, during the penalty stage of the trial in State v. Berry,
to the supreme court's mandatory review of any death sentence. Justice Dennis agreed
and cited as additional error the "appeal to the fear and passion of the jury" in the
prosecutor's closing argument. See State v. Monroe, 397 So. 2d at 1270; 396 So. 2d 880
(La. 1981) (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): 391 So. 2d 406, 419
(Calogero, J., dissenting to denial of rehearing). In State v. Clark. the prosecutor's
remarks were again cited by Justice Dennis as grounds for reversal of the sentence. In,
addition, Justice Dennis considered Clark's personal plea for the death penalty as an
impermissible arbitrary factor. 389 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
133. The supreme court reviewed two additional death sentences after this Note
was written. In State v. Willie, -So. 2d-. (La. 1982). the sentence was over-
turned; the sentence was upheld in State v. Mattheson. 407 So. 2d 1150 (La. 1981).
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